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This paper assesses the impacts of the WTO Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) on trade
in both goods and services among members using a gravity model applied to a panel dataset covering
20 OECD countries over the period 1996-2008 for trade in goods and 1999-2008 for trade in services.
The agreement dates from 1996 and covers 41 (mainly OECD) countries (/areas). China is now negotiating
possible membership. Little has been written on the GPA which is a plurilateral agreement covering
both goods and services. It mutually extends commitments only to signatories, but has commitments
going beyond those in the earlier GATT procurement code. Government service markets are large,
and trade in these also has spillover effects on trade in services and goods.
Results suggest that GPA membership has a positive impact on trade in both goods and services between
parties as well as on outward foreign affiliate service sales. The number of GPA parties has a small
marginal negative effect on trade in goods. Service exports also increase slightly with more parties
participating in the GPA. The growth of government procurement contracts above the threshold under
the GPA also fosters service imports, exports and outward foreign affiliate sales.
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The WTO Government Procurement Agreement   
and Its impacts on Trade 
1. INTRODUCTION 
    Governments at central and sub-central levels as well as other public entities play an important 
role in world trade. But it was not until the Tokyo Round that efforts began to bring government 
procurement under international trade rules. The belief was that discriminatory government 
procurement practices were a significant non-tariff barrier and retarded the growth of world trade. 
Under the GATT Government Procurement Agreement signed in 1979 (GATT GPA 1979), 
government procurement entities were obliged to follow core multilateral trade rules, i.e. 
non-discrimination and transparency rules. But since the conclusion of the Uruguay Round in 
1994, ongoing negotiated procurement liberalization has been focused on the WTO Government 
Procurement Agreement (WTO GPA 1994). It is not a condition of WTO membership that 
countries join the GPA, since the GPA superseded the 1994 single undertaking when the WTO 
evolved from the GATT. The agreement is a plurilateral agreement only involving signatories and 
embodies deeper commitments than the GATT GPA 1979 both in terms of itemized coverage and 
thresholds for competitive bidding. It began in 1996 as an arrangement to which 21 countries 
initially committed themselves, including US, Japan and the EU;    Other countries have 
subsequentially joined, and currently around 41 countries are parties to the agreement. As with 
other trade agreements, with non-discriminatory and transparency among parties as key rules, 
parties are entitled to impartial (thus enhanced) access rights to foreign member markets, but 
simultaneously agree to grant those rights to other member countries.     4 
 
Despite its potential significance for world trade, there are few papers which empirically 
evaluate its impacts on trade flows, and especially on trade in services. We evaluate its impacts in 
ways which take advantage of the sequential addition of countries to GPA membership. We first 
outline the evolution of the GPA and also highlight the gap between its nominal and real coverage. 
We use data on notifications to the WTO GPA committee of procurement contract awards under 
the GPA over time to assess the government procurement market size for the main GPA parties. 
We then use a gravity model to estimate the GPA’s impacts on trade flows using the panel data for 
20 OECD countries from 1996 to 2008.   
Our results show that the WTO GPA has had a positive influence on inter-OECD trade in goods 
and services as well as on outward foreign affiliate service sales. Simple data analysis of contracts 
awarded under the GPA overestimates the extent of trade and impacts of the GPA since not all 
GPA covered international transactions would not have occurred without the GPA. Hence our use 
of a gravity model.    Additional, restrictions in GPA articles and regulations also imply that 
enhanced market access by foreign suppliers will not be automatically achieved through 
membership of the GPA.   
  5 
 
2. The Origins of the WTO Government Procurement Agreement 
2.1 The GPA from 1979 to 2010 
Buy national policies in government purchasing (government procurement) were omitted from 
the original GATT in Article III  “National Treatment on Internal Taxation and Regulation” and 
Article XVII  “State Trading Enterprises”  in 1947. The first GATT Agreement on Government 
Procurement (GATT GPA) was signed only in 1979 and entered into force in 1981. It contained 
obligations of non-discrimination (national treatment and most-favored-nation treatment (MFN)) 
and transparency rules for procurement of goods by central government entities of its signatories, 
and a purchasing contract threshold set at SDR 150,000.   
In 1987, the GATT GPA 1979 was amended by adding a limited number of services (such as 
construction services), reducing the threshold for contracts involving goods for central 
government entities to SDR 130,000 and setting the threshold for construction contracts at a 
higher level of SDR 5,000,000. The amended GATT GPA entered into force in 1988. 
But during the Uruguay Round, parties to the Agreement also held negotiations trying to extend 
the scope and coverage of the Agreement to sub-central government and quasi-governmental 
bodies, and also to services and construction services as well as incorporating a bid-challenge 
system. As a result, a new GPA (WTO GPA) was signed at the end of the Uruguay Round in 1994, 
and entered into force on 1 January 1996. A new revised text was agreed in December2006 and 
updated in December 2010.     
Table 1 summarizes the evolution of these Agreements. This history embodies two major 
milestones. One was the introduction of GATT GPA in 1979 which brought government 
procurement under GATT. The other was the WTO GPA of 1994 which broadened the coverage of 6 
 
the GPA under WTO. 
Table 1          The Evolution of GATT and WTO Agreements on Government Procurement 
Date   GPA Version 
1947  Government procurement excluded under GATT Article III:8 and XVII:2 
April 1979  GPA 1979 signed 
January 1981  GPA 1979 enters into force 
November 1983  Negotiations based on Article IX:6(b) of GPA 1979 commence 
November 1986  Protocol to the Agreement include amendments to Articles I, II, IV, V 
and VI of GPA 1979 
January 1988  Amended GPA 79 enters into force 
April 1994  GPA 1994 signed in Marrakesh 
January 1996  GPA 1994 enters into force 
February 1997 — 
ongoing 
Preparatory work for negotiations under Article XXIV:7 of GPA 1994 
December 2006  Provisionally agreed revised GPA text (GPA/W/297) 
December 2010  Provisionally agreed revised GPA text (GPA/W/313) 
Source: WTO, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/overview_e.htm  
2.2  GPA  Parties  and  Observers 
As a plurilateral agreement, the WTO GPA (hereafter GPA) only regulates government 
procurement practices on a voluntary basis of those WTO members who choose to bind in the 
GPA. The GPA itself has no enforcement mechanism for commitments going beyond WTO 
obligations.    So far, the membership of GPA is still limited.    Most of the 41 parties
1 are 
developed countries (areas) and NICs
2, while the majority of developing countries have not joined.   
There are also 27 observers
3  in the GPA Committee who approve accession to the GPA.    9 
                                                               
1  Current GPA members (with effect from 1 January 2010) include Canada, European Communities (including its 27 member 
States: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden, and United Kingdom), Hong Kong China, Iceland, Israel, Japan, Korea, Liechtenstein, Netherlands with respect to Aruba, 
Norway, Singapore, Switzerland, Chinese Taipei, United States. 
2  Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong and Israel participated in the Uruguay Round as developing countries, however, they are so called 
new industrialized countries not typical developing countries. 
3  Current GPA observers(with effect from 1 July 2010) include 23 countries and 4 international intergovernmental organizations, 
among which Albania, Armenia, China, Georgia, Jordan, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Oman, Panama are undergoing acceding 
negotiation. 7 
 
countries are currently in ongoing negotiation for accession.     
The smaller number of GPA members than of the WTO reflects the reluctance of most 
developing countries to join the GPA. Current GPA members have frequently tried to persuade 
countries seeking to join the WTO (especially those with a large state sector) to commit to joining 
the GPA upon WTO accession, although GPA membership is not a prerequisite for WTO 
accession (Wang, 2007).   
Table 2 lists the entry date of GPA parties and observers. EU members make up more than half 
of the parties, and the rest are in North America and Asia. All 27 observers are developing 
countries in Asia, South America and Africa, except Australia and New Zealand, which are OECD 
members in Oceania. Among observers who have started negotiating accession, China is the 
prime concern of the current GPA parties; not only because of its high growth rate and large size 
of its economy, but also due to the historically dominant role and large size of different level of 
governments. 
Table 2    Entry and Acceptance Date of GPA Parties and Observers 
Parties 











Canada, United States, Japan, Norway, 
Switzerland, Israel 
01/01/1996  Albania *  02/10/2001 
European Communities with regard to its 










Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom 











Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, 
Poland, Slovak Republic and 
Slovenia 








Bulgaria and Romania  01/01/2007  Kyrgyz Republic*  05/10/1999 
Hong Kong , China  19/06/1997  Moldova *  29/09/ 2000 
Iceland  28/04/2001  Mongolia  23/02/1999 
Korea  01/01/1997  New Zealand  09/12/2008 
Liechtenstein  18/09/1997  Oman *  03/05/2001 
the Netherlands with respect to Aruba  25/10/1996  Panama *  29/09/1997 
Singapore  20/10/1997  Saudi Arabia  13/12/2007 
Chinese Taipei  15/07/2009  Sri Lanka  23/04/2003 
    Turkey  04/06/1996 
    Ukraine  25/02/2009 
Note: * means the observer is undergoing negotiating accession 
Source: WTO, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/memobs_e.htm 
2.3 The difference between the GPA’s nominal and real coverage 
The impact of GPA membership on its members’ trade is qualified in various ways since the 
effective coverage of commitment to the GPA is ambiguous due to a four step procedure of 
accession negotiations covering membership, entity coverage, product coverage and threshold. 
Countries have to first choose whether to join the GPA when they become WTO members. After 
the accession procedure to the GPA starts, observers can then determine which entities are bound 
under their GPA commitments. Under the Annex 1 to3 of Appendix  Ⅰ  of the GPA, each party 
notifies lists of central level government, sub-central government and other public entities covered. 
Only those entities in the list undertake GPA commitments. For example, many parties exclude 
the department of defense from their central government list.   
Product coverage is also typically selective for GPA members. As a general rule, all goods are 
covered by the GPA, while Annexes 4 and 5 to Appendix I specify each Party's covered services 9 
 
and construction services
4. Services deemed sensitive, for instance dredging, transportation, R&D, 
and printing services, are often excluded from GPA parties’ Annex 4. Finally, the threshold value 
above which the public procurement contract is obliged to follow GPA rules can provide a fourth 
element of weakened coverage. For each party of the GPA, there are 9 (3 times 3) thresholds to be 
determined for three categories of products (goods, services and construction services) and 
entities (central government, sub-central government and other entities);    though generally there 
are ranges set for thresholds.     
Table 3 reports the GPA threshold commitments of the EU, Japan and USA. These thresholds 
differ among the three categories, with a much higher threshold for construction services. Due to 
different financial regimes across countries, the thresholds for three types of entities vary among 
members, while sub-central government and other social entities apply higher thresholds than 
central government entities. 
Table 3        Threshold Commitment of Main GPA Parties         unit: thousand SDRs 
COUNTRY    ANNEX 1  ANNEX 2  ANNEX 3 




















130   130   5,000   200   200   5,000   400   400   5,000  




200   200   15,000       
Architectural 
services: 1,500 















Source: WTO, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/thresh_e.htm 
                                                               
4  The newly provisionally agreed revised GPA text 2010 differ from preceding version in one way that one new Annex is added to 
list the goods covered by each party, therefore the coverage of goods becomes selective, and there are altogether 7 Annexes in 
Appendix  Ⅰ, with Annex 1 to 3 for entity list, Annex 4 to 6 for product list, and Annex 7 as General Notes. 10 
 
The GPA text (article XV in the GPA 1994, article III and XIII in the GPA 2006 and 2010) also 
provides exceptions to its general nondiscriminatory rules and open or selective tendering 
procedures which can also potentially provide extra coverage for own country preferential 
government procurement activities. Although negotiations on government procurement in the 
Tokyo and Uruguay Round achieved substantial expansion of coverage by extending rules to the 
procurement of goods and services (including construction services) by national and sub-central 
level government as well as public entities, the selection of membership, entity coverage, product 
coverage and threshold along with the exception option for nondiscriminatory and transparency 
rules once again make the GPA’s real coverage unclear.             11 
 
3. The government procurement market under the GPA 
3.1 The government procurement market for main GPA parties   
3.1.1 Market size 
A critical element in assessing the impact of the GPA on inter-party trade flows is the size of the 
GPA covered procurement market. There are two different methods for calculating the size of the 
government procurement market for GPA countries, reflecting two different sources of available 
data. One uses the SNA (System of National Accounts) to estimate the size of the government 
procurement market based on government receipts and payments. This method yields an upper 
based in estimate of the possible scale of government procurement since not all government 
expenditure other than compensation of employees and defense can be treated as government 
procurement. EC(1997,1998), Francois et al.(1996) , Trionfetti (2000) and OECD (2001) use this 
method using the 1968 version of the SNA to yield consistent data across countries. 
  The other method uses a bottom-up approach based directly on data on procurement 
expenditure by national entities responsible for procurement decisions and forming their WTO 
notifications. This approach yields a direct estimate of the size of government procurement market 
since government procurement values are based on a contract by contract basis. It is however not 
ideal because of a lack of consistency across countries subject in notification requirements. The 
data source for this bottom-up method is annual data submit by the GPA parties to the WTO on 
their procurement covered by the GPA; and periodic surveys of the Tenders Electronic Daily 
(TED) and notices published in the Official Journal of European Union (OJEU) with respect to 
the requirement of the EU members (through EU Directives) to publish procurement tender and 
contract award notices   12 
 
Table 4 reports literature estimates of the size of procurement markets using both SNA-based 
and bottom-up approaches. The estimates for the ratio of public procurement to GDP lie in a wide 
range between 0.42% to 19.96%, illustrating the disparity among studies. Using a bottom-up 
approach, our estimates on a aggregate basis are similar to those of EC (2000), while the estimate 
on an above threshold basis is significantly higher than that of Hoekman (1997) which only takes 
procurement of goods by central governments into consideration. This difference is, to some 
extent, a reflection of the evolution of the GPA from the Tokyo Round to the Uruguay Round. 
Table 4    Estimates of the size of government procurement markets 




























SNA-based              
EC(1988) SNA-OECD  EU-12 1987      11.7%  Yes 
EC(1997)     SNA-OECD  EU-15  1994      11.2-11.8%  Yes 
Francois et al  SNA-OECD    USA  92-93  18.3%      Yes 
Trionfetti SNA-UN  9  OECD  83-90   7-9%    
Trionfetti  IMF data  8 OECD  84-90    10-18%     
OECD SNA-OECD  28  OECD  90-97  19.96%
*  9.17%
* 7.75%
* Table  A1 
OECD SNA-OECD  13  OECD  90-97    9.02%
* 7.79%
* Table  A3 





* Table  A2 
Bottom-up              
Hoekman WTO  20  83-92 0.42%       
EC(2000)  Official 
Journal 
EU-15 93-98      13.9-14.6%   
Note: *= weighted average;    In the reported EC studies, the ratios measure public procurement. 
Source: OECD (2001)   
Figure 1 displays EU government procurement to GDP as a proportion of GDP, as an example 
of a large region situation, with added detail among above threshold and aggregate (above and 13 
 
below threshold). In the figure the ratio of the government procurement to GDP is roughly 
constant over time, and government procurement above threshold is only one-tenth to one-fifth of 
aggregate procurement, suggesting space and opportunity for the GPA to play a role in the future. 
There is a trend of growth in the absolute value of government procurement on either basis of 
above threshold or aggregate.   
Figure 1 Estimates of the size of the EU government procurement market: 
1996-2008 
 
Note: EU (15 members, EU Institutions excluded) 1996-2003 
     EU  (25  members,  EU  Institutions  excluded)  2004-2006 
     EU  (27  members,  EU  Institutions  excluded)  2007 
     GP  means  Government  Procurement 
























    US notifications to the WTO on government procurement under the GPA are not as detailed as 
those for the EU, and data on government procurement below threshold are available only at 
federal government level. Table 5 reports estimates of the size of government procurement 
markets in the US and the ratio to GDP. The proportion of the US federal government 
procurement above threshold is high, amounting to more than 90% of total procurement for 
Annex 1 commitments. Also, the absolute value of government procurement in the US increases 
nearly three times from 1996 to 2008, while the ratio to GDP ranges from 5-9%. 
Table 5    Estimates of the size of the US government procurement market: 
1 9 9 6 - 2 0 0 8                   Unit: billion US$ 













Procurement as % of 
GDP   (%) 
1996 216.130 9.101 485.900  7783.9  6.24 
1997 195.742 9.671 477.871  8278.9  5.77 
1998 197.899 9.286 496.531  8741  5.68 
1999 205.408 9.857 525.675  9301  5.65 
2000 63.503 5.692  414.226 9898.8  4.18 
2001 133.268 4.638 528.632 10233.9  5.17 
2002 180.878 5.146 610.245 10590.2  5.76 
2003 320.834 5.809 767.006 11089.2  6.92 
2004 250.677 5.956 722.179 11812.3  6.11 
2005 380.502 9.519 890.221 12579.7  7.08 
2006 431.328 7.122 964.041 13336.2  7.38 
2007 760.510 7.328  1316.993  14061.8  9.37 
2008 384.945 8.082  1150.161  14369.1  8.00 
Note: *total government procurement is added up across the contract awards of entities in Annex1 (both above 
and below threshold), Annex 2 and Annex 3. 
Source: GDP data are from World Development Indicators, World Bank, 2010. Data on the government 
procurement are calculated by the authors using US’ GPA notification to the WTO. 
 
Based on these estimates of the size of government procurement markets in the EU and the US, 
if government procurement below threshold is excluded, government procurement markets 15 
 
covered by the GPA are about 3% of GDP for the EU and 7-8% for the US. These estimates are 
lower than most earlier OECD studies based on SNA data source.   
3.2 The composition of government procurement markets under the GPA for the main GPA 
parties 
3.2.1 By entity 
The central, sub-central government and other entities are the three categories covered by the 
GPA, and their relative importance in the government procurement market varies between 
different countries. However, with thresholds set for most parties of the GPA, the threshold for 
Annex 3 (other entities) is generally higher than that for Annex 1, and also sometimes Annex 2. 
The entity composition for EU and US government procurement markets reflect threshold levels 
for different entities (See Figure 2 and Figure 3). In the EU government procurement market 
under the GPA
5, other entities with the highest threshold are the smallest portion. These relative 
share account for about 10-15%, while the sub-central government is the largest with a 50% share. 
The share for the central government is nearly 30-35%.   
Figure 2    Entity composition of the EU government procurement market 
under the GPA: 1996-2008 
 
                                                               
5  The government procurement market under the GPA means that only those contracts belonging to product list in Annex 4 to 6 







1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
central government entities sub‐central government entities other entities16 
 
Source : Calculated by the authors using data on EU GPA notifications to the WTO. 
As with the US case, the relative ranking across the three categories are the same as for the EU, 
except that the share for Annex 3 is minor. The share for central governments is roughly 40%. 
Figure 3    Entity composition of the US government procurement market 
under the GPA: 1996-2008 
 
Source : Calculated by the authors using data on US GPA notifications to the WTO. 
3.2.2 By product 
Products covered by the GPA are divided into two categories, goods and services. When we 
analyze the product composition of the government procurement market under the GPA, we 
include construction services in the services category. Within the two major categories, services 
occupy the dominate position, with 60-65% of government procurement above threshold. This is 
the case for the EU, US and Japan. According to the WTO Universal List of Services in WTO 
document code of MTN.GNS/W/120, construction services belong to the services category. In the 
GPA, the threshold for construction service is individually listed. This is because construction 
services purchased by governments and other entities (especially state-owned enterprises) are 
often connected to other infrastructure construction with large contracts.   







1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
central government entities sub‐central government entities other entities17 
 
Under GPA Article  Ⅲ, the principles of non-discrimination apply to both foreign affiliates and 
ownership (Article  Ⅲ:2(a)) and country of origin (Article  Ⅲ:2(b))
6. This means that foreign 
suppliers can compete against domestic suppliers and meet procurement bids either through 
cross-border supply or foreign affiliation sales. Based on the notifications of GPA parties, 
government procurement markets seem far from being internationally integrated. Figure 4 shows 
the relative shares of Japan’s government procurement above threshold for goods and services by 
domestic suppliers and foreign suppliers. Even compared with the low share of procurement for 
goods by non-Japan suppliers, the situation of market access is even lower in the service sector, 
which suggests a strong home bias in government procurement markets.   
Figure4    Origin composition of Japan’s Government Procurement 
                 on  Goods  and  services  under  the  GPA:1997-2008   unit: billion SDR 
 
Source: Calculated by the authors using data on Japan’s GPA notifications to the WTO    
                                                               















4. Assess the impact of the GPA using a gravity model 
The gravity model has been widely applied in empirical trade analysis, following Tinbergen 
(1962) and Pöyhönen(1963). More recent developments (e.g. Anderson,1979; Helpman and 
Krugman, 1985; Deardorff ,1995; Feenstra et al., 2001; Eaton and Kortum, 2002; Anderson and 
Wincoop, 2003) also support the use of gravity models from a trade theoretic view point. Gravity 
models have previously been used to analyze the impact of barriers to services trade by comparing 
predicted and actual levels of services trade flows (see Francois,2001; Park, 2002; Grunfeld and 
Moxnes, 2003;etc ) and to compare differences in determinants of trade in services and goods (see 
Kimura and Lee, 2006; Lennon, 2006). Here we use a standard gravity model augmented with 
GPA variables to assess the GPA’s impact on bilateral trade flows in both goods and services 
among GPA parties.   
Academic research on the impact of government procurement on international trade flows 
started in the 1970s. Baldwin (1970) argued that discriminatory procurement policy may have 
inconsequential impacts on trade flows under assumptions of perfect substitution between 
domestic and foreign products, a relative small size of government procurement and unique 
market price for private and public demand. His proposition was further examined by Mattoo 
(1996). McAfee & McMillan (1989), Trionfetti (2000), Evenett & Hoekman (2004, 2005) analyze 
the welfare effect of different discriminatory form of government procurement practices. 
Empirical studies including Baldwin and Richardson (1972) and Trionfetti (2001) show that the 
discriminatory government procurement exists and has a negative impact on import. 
4.1 Empirical specifications and data   
A standard gravity model takes the following form: 19 
 
                                                                   ( 1 )  
where  T    bilateral trade flows (exports or /and imports) between country i and country j, 
GDP =economic mass of country i,  GDP = economic mass of country j,    DISTij = geographical 
distance between the capitals of country i and country j,  E  =error term.  
In order to capture the impacts of the GPA on bilateral trade in goods and services, we 
introduce three additional variables on the right side. One is a dummy variable GPA, which takes 
the value 1 if the two countries i and j are both members of the GPA. A positive effect on bilateral 
trade is expected from the dummy variable GPA. The second is NGPA, an interactive variable 
obtained by multiplying the dummy variable GPA by the total number of GPA parties in year t 
( represented as “gpan” ). We use this interactive variable to capture the effect of the number of 
GPA partiess on bilateral trade in goods and services. The expected effect of the NGPA on 
bilateral trade is negative since bilateral trade may be switched to new or other members of the 
GPA. The third variable is CLNGVI (CLNGVJ), also an interactive variable, obtained by 
multiplying the dummy variable GPA by the log of an index of government procurement values 
above threshold (with the government procurement value under GPA in year 2000 equaling 1 in 
the base period) for country i or country j (represented as “gvii” or “gvij”). The government 
procurement value above threshold under the GPA by different members is provided in different 
local currency units, hence, we use this indexing method to control for this influence. This 
interactive variable captures variation in government procurement values on bilateral trade in 
goods and services. 
A final dummy variables RTA is included to reflect the impact of trading bloc membership. As a 
plurilateral agreement only applicable to signatories, the GPA is similar to a RTA. We use dummy 20 
 
variable RTA to control for the influence of other trade-related arrangements. RTA takes the value 
1 if the two countries i and j signed a free trade agreement with each other.    
In existing gravity model literature, there is no consensus on whether the dependent variable 
should be exports, imports or total trade flows (i.e. the sum of export and import). We use both 
exports and imports as dependent variables, since home biased government purchasing will 
reduce imports while GPA membership will potentially yield enhanced access rights to foreign 
member markets. Since members simultaneously agree to grant rights to other member countries 
both exports and imports should increase.   
Our estimation equations are 
                                                                                       
                                                                                                         (2) 
                                                                                       
                                                                                             ( 3 )  
where NGPA =GPA*gpan and gpan =the number of GPA parties in year t;    CLNGVI = 
GPA*Lngvii and Lngvii = log of index of government procurement value above threshold in 
country i (with the year 2000 as the base period); CLNGVJ=GPA*Lngvij and Lngvij= log of 
index of government procurement value above threshold in country j (with the year 2000 as the 
base period). 
Equations (2) and (3) are similar to each other, except that when the dependent variable is 
imports of country i from country j, only procurement values above threshold for country i matter, 
while procurement values above threshold of country j affect the opposite trade flow, i.e. export of 
country i to country j. 
4. 2.3 Data and methodology 21 
 
   T h e   d ata we use is from OECD statistics on international trade in services, and is available 
for both service exports and imports, broken down by partner country, and for 20 OECD member 
countries from the years 1999 to 2008. Data are on a balance-of-payments basis, and mainly 
reflect GATS supply mode 1 (cross-border supply) and mode 2 (consumption abroad) of trade in 
services. Supply mode 3(commercial presence) of trade in services is of special importance in 
competing for government procurement contract for foreign suppliers.   
Service imports and exports via foreign affiliates are likely the most affected when countries 
enter the GPA. Data on bilateral trade in service for foreign affiliate trade in services among 
OECD members is not directly available. We use inward and outward foreign affiliate turnover 
data with industry sector division specified within services on the UN international standard 
industrial classification basis code (ISIC Rev.3) as proxies of service exports and imports via 
mode 3. To check the robustness of results, we compare results when service exports and imports 
are on a BOP basis (SE/SI) and service exports and imports are on a FATS basis (FAE/FAI) as 
dependent variables. For trade in goods, we also compare the impact of the GPA on exports (GE) 
and imports (GI).   
Our data covers 20 OECD members
7. For trade in goods, the period starts from 1996 and ends 
in 2008, since the GPA came into effect under the WTO in 1996. For trade in services, the period 
is 1999 to 2008, since the earliest available data on bilateral services trade released by the OECD 
starts from 1999. 
  Bilateral exports and imports data on trade in goods are obtained from the UN COMTRADE 
database. Bilateral exports and imports data on trade in services (BOP and Foreign Affiliate Sales) 
                                                               
7  The full list of countries included in the sample : Australia, Austria, Canada, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, US. 22 
 
are from OECD Statistics. GDP data are from World Development Indicators, and the distance in 
kilometers between capitals are from COW database Version 2.0. RTA data are from RTA database 
of WTO. GPA, NGPAN, CLNGVI/CLNGVJ data are calculated by the authors based on WTO 
notifications.  
  We first use an ordinary least squares regression with pooled data, and then use fixed country 
and time effect regressions using panel data following the arguments of Egger(2000) and 
Feenstra(2003) that the proper specification of the gravity model in most applications would be 
one of fixed country and time effects, which reflect both the time-invariant export- and 
import-country effects and the common business cycle or globalization process over the sample 
period. The Hausman test also supports using fixed effect rather than random effects models. 
  4.3  Results 
    Table 7 presents the summary statistics for the variable used in the estimations. Definitions are 
provided in the text and S.D., Min., Max. and N denote standard deviation, minimum, maximum 
and number of observation, respectively. The mean of NGPA, Lngvii and Lngvij are used to 
calculate the net effect of the dummy variable GPA on bilateral trade flow. In a similar way, the 
mean of dummy variable GPA is used to calculate the net impact of number of the GPA parties 
and government procurement valued bounded to the GPA of each member on bilateral trade flow.   
Table  7   Summary  Statistics 
Trade in goods  Trade in services (BoP and Foreign Affiliate Sales) 
Variable  Mean  S. D.  Min  Max  N  Variable  Mean  S. D.  Min  Max  N 
LnGI  7.411   2.133   -5.498   12.734   4820  LnSI  6.737   1.926   -0.061    10.760 2626   
LnGE  7.328   2.162   -2.500    12.776   4820 LnSE  6.814   1.872   0.000   11.051  2671  
LnGDPi  13.208   1.450   9.826   16.481   4940  LnFAI  9.016   2.487   0.000   15.233 1124   
LnGDPj  13.208   1.450   9.826   16.481   4940  LnFAE  9.423   2.886   0.385   17.388 706   
LnDIST
a  8.230   1.225   5.438   9.896   4940  LnGDPi
b  13.289 1.430   9.913   16.481 3800   23 
 
GPA  0.659   0.474   0   1   4940  GPA  0.682   0.466   0   1   3800  
NGPA  20.380   15.439   0   39   4937  NGPA  22.183  15.864  0   39   3800  
CLNGVI  0.144   0.568   -1.067   2.483   3420  CLNGVI  0.263   0.526   -0.678   2.483   2622  
CLNGVJ  0.142   0.565   -1.067   2.483   3420  CLNGVJ  0.263   0.525   -0.678   2.483   2622  
RTA  0.447   0.497   0   1   4940  RTA  0.468   0.499   0   1   3800 
gpan  30.465   5.957   22   39   4937  gpan  32.200  5.654   26   39   3800  
Lngvii  0.165   0.624   -1.067   2.483   3420  Lngvii  0.316   0.562   -0.678   2.483   2622  
Lngvij  0.165   0.624   -1.067   2.483   3420  Lngvij  0.316   0.562   -0.678   2.483   2622  
Note: a: applicable to LnDIST for trade in services. The only difference between this explanatory for trade in 
goods and trade in services is the length of time period, which has no effect for the time-invariant 
variable of bilateral distance. 
          b:applicable to LnGDPj for trade in services. The summary statistics for LnGDPi and LnGDPj for trade in 
services are the same. 
Table 8 reports pooled regression results for these specifications, with six dependent variables 
( Log of GI, GE, SI, SE, FAI and FAE) corresponding to columns (1)-(6) respectively. Focusing 
on the explanatory variables related to the GPA, the coefficients    for the dummy variable GPA 
are positive and significant at 1 percent level in columns (1) to (4), which indicate a positive 
impact for the GPA on bilateral trade in goods and bilateral trade in services via cross-border 
supply mode.   
For trade in services via the commercial presence mode, the dummy variable GPA is not 
significant for inward foreign affiliates sales. It is dropped in the regression for outward foreign 
affiliates sales
8. The interactive variable NGPA has a minor negative coefficient      as expected 
and is significant in most equations.  The coefficients     for NGPA in column (1) and (2) are 
larger than those in column (3) and (4). This suggests that GPA bilateral trade in goods may be 
switched more easily between suppliers than bilateral trade in services. The intangibility of 
services makes the switching costs higher for buyers and bilateral trade in services tends to repeat 




The interactive variable CLNGVI/CLNGVJ has a positive and significant coefficient     in 
column (3) to (6), but we find no significant coefficient for this explanatory variable for trade in 
goods. Meanwhile within the two different supply modes for trade in services, exports and 
imports via foreign affiliate sales are more affected than trade flows involving cross-border supply. 
We attribute the difference in the impact of this explanatory variable on trade in goods and in 
services, as well as the different effects between the two supply modes of trade in services to the 
high share of services in product composition and high preference for local presence of suppliers 
by procuring entities in the government procurement market.         
Table 8      OLS regression results 



































































































CLNGVJ   0.00696  0.159***   0.670*** 
   (0.0311)  (0.0417)   (0.205) 




























Observations  3320 3318 2115 1822  1,099 
  528 
R-squared  0.843 0.854 0.815 0.752 0.235  0.580 
Note: *,**and*** indicate statistical significance at 90%, 95% and 99% level, respectively. 25 
 
     Robust  standard  errors  in  parentheses. 
All the traditional gravity control variables, such as the log of GDP of importers and exporters 
and the log of distance are of the right sign and statistically significant, except that distance and 
RTA are not significant in column (6) for FAE. Generally, the magnitudes of the coefficients are 
also in line with previous literature. Distance has more negative effects on trade in goods than on 
trade in services regardless of the different supply modes of services, while RTAs are more 
important for trade in services than trade in goods. This indicates the relative importance of 
transportation cost for trade in goods and institutional cost for trade in services. 
Table 9 presents results from the regressions for country and time fixed effects models using 
panel data, with six dependent variables ( Log of GI, GE, SI, SE, FAI and FAE) corresponding to 
columns (1)-(6). The coefficients of log of GDP of exporter and importer also have correct signs 
and are statistically significant, consistent with the previous pooled regression results. The log of 
geographical distance are dropped in the country and time fixed effect regressions since they are 
time-invariant. Based on statistical significance, the dummy variable RTA only shows a positive 
impact on service export via cross-border supply and inward foreign affiliate sales. 
Focusing on the three explanatory variables used to reflect the impact of the GPA on bilateral 
trade, the coefficient       for dummy variable GPA is positive and significant at 1 percent level in 
column (1) to (4), similar to the pooled regression results. These indicate a positive impact of the 
GPA on bilateral trade in goods and bilateral trade in services via cross-border supply mode. For 
trade in service via commercial presence mode,      is not significant for inward foreign affiliates 
sales and is dropped in the regression for outward foreign affiliates sales partly because there are 
too many empty cells to use fixed effects defined over the sample unit as the choice set. However, 
the higher       in column (3) and (4) suggests that bilateral trade in services is affected more than 26 
 
for bilateral trade in goods by GPA membership.   
The interactive variable NGPA has a negative coefficient     , and is highly significant in 
column (1) and (2), while when the dependent variables involves trade in services, regression 
estimates suggest that the GPA has only a small marginal positive effect on service exports via 
cross-border supply. We attribute the difference in the sign of the coefficient for NGPA in goods 
and services to the characteristics of services. This suggests the adverse switching effect on 
bilateral trade in goods can be ignored when assessing GPA impacts on bilateral trade in services. 
Table 9          Fixed effects results 










































































































CLNGVJ    0.00939    0.0792***    0.153** 
    (0.0149)    (0.0208)    (0.0628) 




























Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Importing country 
fixed effect 
Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effect  Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  3320 3318 2115  1822  1,099 
  528 27 
 
R-squared  0.410 0.619 0.588  0.715  0.382  0.489 
Note: *,**and*** indicate statistical significance at 90%, 95% and 99% level, respectively. 
     Robust  standard  errors  in  parentheses. 
The sign and the statistical significance of the coefficient      , for interactive variable 
CLNGVI /CLNGVJ in Table 9 are almost the same as in the pooled regression, except that the 
magnitude of coefficients in fixed effects regressions becomes smaller. We find no significant 
coefficients for this explanatory variable in trade in goods and inward foreign affiliate sales. The 
positive coefficients in column (3),(4) and(6) indicate that with government procurement values 
above threshold under the GPA, bilateral trade in services and outward foreign affiliate service 
sales increase. Due to the high proportion of services possess in the government procurement 
market, any increase in government procurement value above threshold will be largely attributed 
to services and in turn stimulate bilateral trade in services. 
The net effects of GPA membership, number of the GPA members and the growth rate of 
government procurement values above bound thresholds for the GPA on bilateral trade flow are 
reported in Table 10. Except for service imports via foreign affiliate sales, GPA membership is 
positive factor for bilateral trade between the included OECD countries during the sample period. 
The coefficients on service imports and exports via cross-border supply mode are higher than for 
goods imports and exports. This indicates that GPA membership plays more important role in 
promoting bilateral trade in services than for trade in goods. A possible reason may be that 
service suppliers gain more potential business opportunities in the government procurement 
market with non-discriminatory and transparent policies than manufacturing suppliers since 
services account for the majority of the government procurement market for most GPA parties. 
Results also suggest that exports are influenced more by GPA membership than is the case for 28 
 
imports. The value of the coefficient for exports (both trade in goods and services) is almost 
three times of that of imports.   
The number of GPA parties has small marginal negative effects on trade in goods. For service 
exports it has the opposite sign. Service transactions tend to be repeated and based on reciprocal 
trust and satisfaction attained in previous deals. Switching costs for either service consumer or 
service producer are typically higher than for tangible goods consumer and producer. With more 
members participating in the GPA, bilateral trade in goods between pairs of countries may thus 
decrease slightly due to switching effects, while existing service trade partners tend to intensify. 
The log of index of government procurement values for importers or exporters is a positive 
determinant of bilateral trade in service, but has no effect on bilateral trade in goods, resulting 
from the high service share in the growth of government procurement value above threshold 
under the GPA.   
Table 10      The net effect of variables relating to the GPA on bilateral trade flows   













Fixed effect regression 
     1.038*** 1.065*** 0.337***  0.665***  0.667  n.a. 
    -0.0067*** -0.0085*** -0.00119 0.0177*** -0.00458 -0.00605 
     -0.0133 0.00939  0.0564*** 0.0792***  -0.0800 0.153*** 
Mean of gpan  30.465  30.465 32.2  32.2  32.2  32.2 
Mean of Lngvii  0.165  0.316    0.316   
Mean of Lngvij   0.165   0.316   0.316 
Mean of GPA    0.659 0.659  0.682 0.682  0.682 0.682 
GPA membership
1  0.0897 0.3091 0.3188  1.4529    0.0483 
Number of the 
GPA members2 
-0.0044 -0.0056    0.0121 
  
Lngvii
3     0.0384       
Lngvij
3      0.0540    0.1043 
From our results we suggest following policy implications. First, trade in services is likely to 29 
 
be fostered by joining the GPA. Country with competitiveness in services will gain from being 
the GPA party and enlargement of service trade, and may have strong incentive to increase the 
number of GPA parties and the degree of openness in government procurement market. Second, 
the high level threshold for the GPA makes foreign affiliate sales the most important supply 
mode in government service procurement market. Procuring entities will prefer suppliers with 
local commercial presence to lower supervision costs when open bidding for large procurement 
contract occurs. This preference for foreign affiliate sales will also deter developing countries 
from entering the GPA since their suppliers are not bidding with large amounts compared to 
rivals from developed countries. 
Some caveats apply to these results . First the share of government procurement above 
threshold from foreign suppliers for each GPA party is not included in the explanatory variables 
due to the unavailability of data in WTO notifications. We use the dummy variable GPA, the 
interactive variables NGPA and CLNGVI/CLNGVJ to measure the possible impacts the GPA 
may have on bilateral trade.    These proxies need not reflect the real changes in market access in 
government procurement market. Second, the effective enforcement of non-discriminatory and 
transparency rules under the GPA is a precondition for the enhanced market access and degree of 
competition in government procurement market, which generates a two-way interaction between 
the GPA and bilateral trade in goods and services. On one hand, only when the enhanced market 
access is achieved will the GPA promote bilateral trade between the GPA parities. On the other 
hand, market access for the government procurement market is determined by both bilateral and 
multilateral trade arrangements concerning goods, services and investment. 
  30 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
In this paper we both discuss the operation of the GPA and the size of markets it covers, and 
also assess the potential impacts of the GPA on trade among contracting parties using a gravity 
model. We extend the simple gravity model by adding three explanatory variables relevant to the 
GPA. These are the GPA membership, the number of the GPA parties and the government 
procurement value above threshold under the GPA. Our panel data covers 20 OECD countries 
among which 17 are GPA members and 3 are non-members. The sample period is 1996-2008 for 
bilateral trade in goods, and 1999-2008 for bilateral trade in services.   
Our results suggest that for most parties the GPA has a positive impact on bilateral trade in 
goods and services, though the magnitude of the impact may varies between trade in goods and 
services ( with different supply modes) . An implication would seem to be that improvements for 
the GPA should focus on the market access rights for foreign suppliers and should consider the 
characteristics of services from goods in order to promote international trade. The WTO could 
also require GPA members to fulfill their obligation in submiting detailed data on government 
procurement above threshold by origins so as to provide a clear cognition of the openness of the 
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